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WOLA-4326

Chief, EE

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Operational/ZIPPER/CAST
UJ-PROLISRY #300

Reference: WOLA-4398

1. Enclosed are ZIPPER memos 5876, 6051, 6118, 6122, 6167 and 6168 giving the recent developments in subject case.

2. Memo 5876 describes UM's plans for the inclusion of V-14509 in subject case. V-14509's suggested tasks were to be the following:

- a. The spotting of successors and/or sub-sources for ADLER.
- b. Acquiring build-up material for ADLER's use.
- c. Looking for a suitable job for ADLER. (As V-14509 would be stationed in the Munich area, the job would probably not be near Heidelberg but a solution would be for ADLER to be employed as a travelling salesman for a firm which would enable him to cover his old territory in Heidelberg and vicinity.)

UM plans to have V-14509 reporting only to him and will not divulge any information on subject case to him. On the other hand any suitable sub-sources and/or successors will be played onto ADLER so that the latter will not be aware that they are controlled by ZIPPER. The latter measure will insure ADLER's safety when the latter is face to face with KATPOL interrogators. Such an operational scheme would be a neat trick but we are of the impression that V-14509 will become aware of exactly what kind of an operation he is involved in. In order for UM to get good results from V-14509, he will have to give him explicit instructions as to exactly what type of people he is looking for. Such prerequisites as anti-communistic, access to Allied military installations, psychologically stable, etc. can only indicate a DA operation to anyone at all familiar with "the business" and V-14509 has had past intelligence experience (see WOLA-3519). Of course, if UM had the time he could omit the requirement of access to Allied military installations and hope that by chance such a type

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could arrive in the United States with-outstanding, to which would state, given approval by V-14509. However, with ADLSE's possible return to Hungary in April, it does not seem that there will be time for this. The possibility of a 21 play in itself on V-14509's part would not endanger the case itself so long as V-14509 does not learn the identity of ADLSE. The above proposals of ZIFER were part of a request for action we had with ZIFER, V-14509 and V-14511 intended to get HQ Headquarters to take a stand on the future of the ADLSE case. Our plan was to get CV 1 to perform all of the spotting and management controlling of ADLSE's sub-sources and/or sub-sources thus preventing an unnecessary extension of ADLSE's organization into West Germany; to get HQ to agree that V-14509 should not undertake any activities involving the gathering of "Spielematerial" for ADLSE; to hear HQ's reasoning on the question of a further build-up of ADLSE vs. his immediate return to Hungary. The ZIFER stand was roughly that the immediate return of ADLSE to Hungary would be tantamount to throwing away a possible turn in the case which could develop should ADLSE be able to report or any qualified sub-sources and/or successors to the KATPOL. ZIFER feels that due to ADLSE's experience in Germany plus his radio training that the possibility definitely exists for him to get an assignment as chief agent or radio operator for a net. Should the sub-sources consist of those which ADLSE has spotted, ZIFER would have another control on the operation through CV 1. The logical extension of this possibility is to let ADLSE remain in West Germany until the KATPOL reacts to his presenting several qualified sub-sources and/or successors. ZIFER agreed, however, to call in CV 1 on the spotting of ADLSE's sub-sources and/or successors and to assign the control of any future sub-sources and/or successors to them. V-14511 will continue to run ADLSE due to the feeling of mutual trust which has been developed between the case officer and agent. Due to the lack of Hungarian experts in CV 1, UK will be called in as an advisor on theory problems evolving from operations which might possibly develop from ADLSE's sub-sources and/or successors and also will serve in a logistical support function, i.e. travel through Austria, for any such operations. Due to the immediacy of ADLSE's possible return to Hungary, ZIFER felt that V-14509 should also perform the spotting function for ADLSE as outlined by UK, but agreed that V-14509 would not undertake to gather any "Spielematerial" for ADLSE and that any personalities spotted by him would ultimately be controlled by CV 1. Thus, we achieved our immediate aim and gave our tacit approval to ADLSE's remaining in West Germany at least until we see the KATPOL reaction after he has reported on any sub-sources and/or successors.

3. Memo 4051 presents UK's plan to have UK transmit his information on Egon FUCHS and Joseph FUCHS with a recommendation as to intelligence reliability. After clearance by Headquarters, UK planned to pass this material on to the KATPOL and then, via external surveillance, determine if either of them were approached by the KATPOL subsequently approaching them for organization control purposes. We need not belabour the unfeasibility of this technique but only mention that ZIFER Headquarters, in the meeting described in para 2 above, favored having the above two individuals investigated and, if the latter is favorable, controlled by CV 1 prior to the passing of any recommendations or detailed summaries of personnel to the KATPOL.

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4. ADLER met his superior officer in Vienna on 1.7.53. ADLER reported that he had posted letter reports 1/10 and 11/1 to KATPOL cover addresses in Budapest on 22.6.53 and 30.6.53 respectively. In report 1/10 ADLER gave the latest bits of information regarding his contacts. In report 11/1 ADLER gave a written explanation of the new BLD's and the Ludwigshafen station and requested that the KATPOL messages be sent an hour or so later during the summer months. ADLER further reported that he had been able to receive KATPOL messages 26/53, but that he had difficulty with 27/53 and was only able to reconstruct the meaning having put all the clearly receivable pieces together. ADLER further stated that he had deposited reports (material already cleared by us) in BLD "Musik" on 18.6.53. From the context of 27/53 ADLER interpreted that the KATPOL had placed material in the BLD; therefore visited it on 28.6.53 and found money, his birth certificate and rubber stamps, plus new instructions from the KATPOL. ADLER also stated that he had been forced by the "Arbeitsamt" to advertise in their magazine for a job as an airplane technician, driver or office helper. ADLER was instructed by his case officer to acknowledge the receipt of the KATPOL material found in the BLD and to study his new BLDs for a discussion at the next meeting (see memo 6118).

5. Memo 6122 reports on the KATPOL deposit in the BLD. ADLER found a hollow key which contained his new BLDs filmed on very thin paper, two birth certificate blanks, three rubber stamps to make the birth certificate official and \$100 plus 200 Austrian schillings. The serial numbers of the \$ notes were as follows: \$10 notes, D74823020B, C97817457D, E56299939F, F54386672F; \$20 notes, A16147580A, E10827121A, A07621721A, E17976707A, B0087202L, E09048106A, E18200491A, D07702548B; \$100 notes, B10065592A, E11307965A. ADLER received the following instructions:

a. To continue looking for a full-time job regardless of the possibility of his being employed in the German Aircraft Industry. Moreover, he was requested to continue reporting in details on his own personal situation.

b. ADLER was encouraged towards more exact and detailed reporting. Some gross inaccuracies in his past reports were cited and he was instructed to follow up leads obtained from the "Stars and Stripes" and to use adjectives such as unconfirmed for any information about which he was ^{not} absolutely positive.

c. ADLER was further urged to continue his spotting activities to as great an extent as possible.

d. The KATPOL also informed ADLER that they wanted him to return to Hungary for about five days in August. They gave him detailed instructions as to how to get to the Soviet Zone of Austria with the documents available to him.

You will note that many of the BLDs given ADLER are far above his present capabilities. He would need possibly unwitting but probably willing inside sources to be able to determine the organizational structure of the "Bundesgrenzschutz" in Munich and of U.S. technical and communications units.

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6. Memo 6157 contains ZITPOL's answer to our query as mentioned in para 4 of ref.

7. ADLER again met his case officer in Munich on 8.7.53. ADLER reported that he had not been able to receive the KATPOL special message announced for 2 and 3.7.53 but that he was able to receive and decode ZITPOL 28/53. ADLER stated that he had sent report II/2 to a KATPOL cover address in Budapest on 6.7.53. In this report ADLER acknowledged the receipt of the material found in the ELD on 28.6.53 and transmitted "Spzialmaterial #3" (see IDILA-4396). ADLER also presented V-14411 with a detailed report on Leon ROCKMANT. V-14411 instructed ADLER to report to the KATPOL in detail on his personal situation and to list his past efforts to successfully legalize himself. Moreover, ADLER was instructed to follow up and investigate leads appearing in the "Stars and Stripes" if they pertain to the Heidelberg-Karlsruhe-Mannheim area. V-14411 also instructed ADLER to carry out only those tasks, with the time limit of 31.7.53 (see memo 6122), which could be fulfilled by external observation. ADLER declared himself ready to return to Hungary and stated that he had completed his forging of a birth certificate and would soon request a "Heinepass" (see memo 6166).

Approved by: